The effect of corporate taxes on investment and the capital stock by Nick Draper & Free Huizinga
CPB Memorandum
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Department : Modeling, labor and Income
Unit : Macro modeling
Author(s) : Nick Draper and Free Huizinga
Date : July 10, 2001
The effect of corporate taxes on investment and the capital stock
This paper analyses the effect of the corporate tax rate on the cost of capital and investment
through two different channels. The first one concerns the fairly standard change in the user
cost of capital, which determines a firm’s optimal capital stock given  that the firm is located in
the Netherlands. The paper demonstrates that a reduction in the corporate tax rate reduces the
user cost of capital because cost of capital is not fully deductible. The second channel deals with
the direct effect of corporate taxation on profits. If capital is sufficiently mobile, the after tax
profit margin cannot be affected by the corporate tax rate in equilibrium. Therefore, a rise in the
corporate tax rate must be compensated by a compensating rise in the markup. We have
assumed that only 35%  of necessary markup rise will  actually be established. To get a feel for
the quantitative effects of these two channels, they have been incorporated into the JADE model,
the econometric macro model of CPB. The results suggest that only considering the user cost of
capital approach ignores an important aspect of the impact of a change in corporate taxation 1I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
2T h e  s e t u p 1
3 The maximization problem 4
4 The steady state 8
5D y n a m i c s 11
6 Infra marginal effects: a suggestion 13
7 Simulation 14
8  Conclusions 17
References 18
Appendix A: derivations 19
Appendix B: Simulation reduction in income taxes 251
      	  
      	
     	 
(1)
1 Introduction
This paper analyses the effect of the corporate tax rate on the cost of capital and investment. The
paper derives a formula for the cost of capital in which taxes and different sources of finance are
explicitly taken into account. The main result is that a decrease in the corporate tax rate has a
positive, neutral or negative effect on the marginal incentive to invest if capital costs are less
than fully, fully or more than fully deductible from corporate taxable income. Calibration for the
Dutch case indicates that a decrease in the corporate tax rate has a positive effect on the
marginal incentive to invest. Since capital costs in the Netherlands are less than fully deductible
from corporate taxation, a reduction in the corporate tax rate has a positive effect on marginal
investment.
The intuition for the result that corporate taxes are marginally neutral if capital costs are fully
deductible is that in that case the marginal benefit and marginal cost of capital both fall
proportionally with the corporate tax rate, so that the marginal cost and marginal benefit of
investment remain equal at the current capital stock. The corporate tax rate then acts as a pure
profits tax. An increase in the corporate tax rate may still hurt overall investment because new
firms may decide not to invest at all or to invest elsewhere. So, a proper analysis of the corporate
tax rate should also take the location decision into account, not just the marginal investment
decision. The paper suggests a simple way of doing that. A simulation with the macro model
JADE provides an indication of the magnitude of both effects.
2 The setup
For given paths of investment and employment over time, the value of a firm may be
determined by a budget restriction indicating how much the firm can pay out in dividends each
period and an arbitrage equation which values this stream of dividends in the capital market.
The budget restriction can be written in several ways, two of which are of particular interest. The
first focusses on the financing of new investment:
Here pi denotes the price of investment goods, i investment, py the price of value added, y value
added, w the wage rate, l employment, b the nominal interest rate on corporate bonds, B the
nominal corporate debt, T the net corporate tax liability (net of any deductions and subsidies), D1 The intuition behind this equation is as follows. Suppose you have Vt to invest this period. If you invest in the
alternative asset you will have (1+a,t+1)Vt next period. If you buy the firm, you will own Vt+1  Nt+1 in stocks next
period, receive (1p)Dt+1 in after tax dividends and have to pay g(Vt+1  Nt+1  Vt) in capital gains taxes. You are
neutral between these options if (1+a,t+1)Vt = Vt+1  Nt+1 +  (1p)Dt+1  g(Vt+1  Nt+1  Vt), which is the arbitrage
equation above.
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the dividend payment, N the issue of new shares and RE retained earnings.  is the first
difference operator so that Bt = Bt  Bt1 is the net issue of new debt. In general, capital letters
denote nominal variables and lowercase letters real variables. The subscript t+j refers to period
t+j. Revenue minus wage bill, interest payments, net corporate taxes and dividend payments
equals retained earnings. So, new investment can be financed by retained earnings (that is, by
reducing dividend payments), by issuing new shares and by issuing new bonds. The second way
of writing the budget constraint focusses on the payment of dividends:
It is just a rewriting of the previous equation. 
The arbitrage equation indicates how this dividend stream is valued by the capital market:
Here a,t is the nominal after tax return on alternative assets (adjusted for risk), g is the personal
tax rate on capital gains and p the personal income tax rate. Vt is the value of the firm at the end
of period t. The firm is valued such that the return a,t+1Vt from having invested Vt in alternative
assets equals the return on owning the firm which consists of a capital gain of Vt+1  Nt+1 taxed
at the rate g and a dividend Dt+1 taxed at the rate p.
1
To get an explicit expression for the value of the firm, we solve the above equation forward. We
assume a,t to be an exogenous constant and find2 The general setup in this paper is not novel, but builds on papers such as Auerbach (1983), Brock and Turnovsky
(1981), and Hasselman (1994). What we add is tractability for macroeconomic modelling purposes by means of
specific assumptions about financing ratios,  a discussion about inframarginal effects and an impression of the
size of macroeconomic effects using the CPB macro model JADE.
3 For an extensive discussion of the effects of the tax reform on investment incentives, see A.L. Bovenberg and H.
ter Rele (1998).
4 The nominal after tax return on the alternative asset a may also change due to the tax reform. This is a general
equilibrium issue and beyond the scope of this paper. Such a change would not affect the theoretical derivations in
this paper, but would affect the numerical calculation of the capital cost.
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This equation indicates that reducing dividends D and new share issues N by the same amount
in any period raises the value of the firm if the capital gains tax is lower than the personal
income tax. The budget constraint indicates that such an operation is also feasible. In the
Netherlands the capital gains tax is zero. So the firm should not issue new shares and pay
dividends at the same time. In fact, stockholders would prefer the firm not to pay dividends at
all, but pay out their profits by buying back shares (which would make N negative). Since in
practice firms do pay dividends, there must be additional restrictions on the firm other than the
simple budget constraint modelled above. For instance, there are legal restrictions on firms’
buying back their own stock. Rather than modelling these, however, we will assume an
exogenous dividend and new share issue policy and consider the effects of this policy on the
financing cost of the firm and on the impact of taxation on firm behaviour. A similar issue will
arise with the firm’s debt policy, and there we will use the same approach.
2 
Tax reform: the tax plan 2001
Starting in 2001 the Dutch tax code will be changed.
3 The important changes for this paper are
that actual returns on wealth are no longer taxed by the personal income tax. Instead, there will
be a 30% tax on a presumed rate of return of 4% on personal wealth, regardless of how it is
invested and what its actual return is. De facto, this amounts to a 1.2 % wealth tax with no tax on
dividends and capital gains. The arbitrage condition (3) then becomes
The capital gains tax rate g and the personal tax rate on dividends p are zero, and there is a
fixed tax rate f equal to 1.2% on wealth both when investing in the alternative asset and when
investing in the firm.
4 The fixed tax fVt drops out of this equation, and therefore, as of 2001,
equations (3) and (4) hold with both g and p equal to zero. In the remainder of the paper we set
g equal to zero since that is the case both before and after the tax reform. We keep the personal5 Fiscal depreciation may be linear or degressive. Fiscal depreciation equal to a fixed percentage of the book value
is allowed if the original investment becomes less productive with age. Since we assume that physical depreciation
is exponential, a degressive fiscal depreciation scheme indeed seems most appropriate.
4
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tax rate on dividends p as part of the derivation so that we can describe both the situation before
and after the tax reform.
3 The maximization problem
To formulate the maximization problem of the firm we need to flesh out the budget constraint.
We assume that yt equals output net of adjustment cost, written as yt = F(kt–1, lt)  c(it, kt1), where
F is a standard production function and c the adjustment cost function. Net taxes Tt consist of
the corporate tax rate c times taxable revenue minus subsidies: Tt = c(py,tyt  wtlt  b,tBt1  At)
 spi,tit, where At is the fiscal depreciation allowance and s the investment subsidy rate. Fiscal
depreciation is based on the historical cost price of investment and is geometric with a fiscal
depreciation rate v.
5 That means that, in period t, the firm is allowed to deduct v(1v)
1pi,tit for
the investment purchased in period t, for all 1. We assume that in each period a fraction b0
of the principal of the debt is repaid, and a fraction b1 of new investment is financed with new
debt. Debt payment, therefore, equals (b,t + b0)Bt1, and total debt evolves as Bt = (1  b0)Bt1 +
b1pitit. We assume that a fraction n of new investment is financed with new equity: Nt = npitit.
Substituting, we may rewrite the expression for dividends as
The firm’s maximization problem can be written as
The Lagrangian incorporates the fact that in the Netherlands the capital gains tax equals zero, so
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physical rate of depreciation. The Lagrangian has been formulated so that the signs of the
Lagrange mulitpliers qt, t and µt are all positive. qt is the shadow value (marginal benefit) of
installed capital, and t and µt the shadow cost (marginal cost) of debt and new equity. Since
debt and new equity policy are exogenous,  the marginal payout of profits to the shareholders
takes place through dividends.
To keep the model simple, we assume that the firm is a price taker in the product and financial
markets. That is, we assume that the prices py,t and pi,t of value added and investment and the
nominal interest rates a and b are given to the firm. Moreover, we assume that the prices grow
at a constant inflation rate  and that the nominal interest rates are constant. 
The Lagrangian contains the present value of the depreciation allowance as one of its
determinants. To differentiate that with respect to it, it is helpful to use the following result
derived in the appendix:
where AFt equals the depreciation allowance for investment purchased up to period t. This
component of the depreciation allowance is fixed. For future investment it+j, j  1, the present
value at time t+j of the depreciation allowance per guilder invested is  / ( + a). To get the
present value at time t, this value is discounted for another j periods.
The first order conditions are:6
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Here the subscripts l, i and k refer to partial derivatives with respect to employment, investment
and capital. The first first-order equation says that the marginal product of labour equal the real
product wage in each period, irrespective of personal or corporate taxation. The reason that taxes
drop out of this equation is that labour costs are fully deductible in each period, so that both the
after tax marginal product of labour and the after tax wage cost fall by the same amount.
Because there is no adjustment cost for employment, the standard first order condition holds in
each period.
Equation (10) states that the shadow price of capital, qt, has two components, both of which
occur in the next period and are discounted by 1+a. The first benefit of investment is increased
production, including the effect on installation costs. The second benefit is that a fraction 1 is
still available for use in the next period, which has a shadow price of qt+1.
Equation (11) says that investment takes place until the shadow price of capital equals its
marginal cost, which consists of two components: the marginal cost of purchasing the
investment good and the marginal cost of installing it. The marginal cost of purchasing
investment depends on the way it is financed, as indicated by the term in between square
brackets. The marginal financing cost per guilder invested has five components: a fraction
1b1nsc/(a+) is financed with retained earnings at an after tax cost of 1p per guilder
invested, a fraction b1 is financed with debt at an after tax cost of t, a fraction n by new equity at
an after tax cost of µt, a fraction s is paid for with investment subsidies, and a fraction c/(a+)
is paid for by the depreciation allowance. Since retained earnings is the residual source of






The result that financing investment with retained earnings carries an after tax financing cost of
1p per guilder invested may seem odd. The reason is that all costs are valued in terms of after
tax income streams to the stockholder. Retained earnings finance implies that dividends are
reduced to pay for the investment. So, if the firm invests one more guilder, dividends are
reduced by the same amount and the after tax income to the stockholder is reduced by 1p
guilders. Therefore, the cost of retained earnings finance equals 1p per guilder invested.
The marginal cost of debt, t, consists of the interest and principal payment that occurr next
period plus the marginal cost of the remaining debt next period, valued at t+1. Since the firm
considers all elements in the dynamic equation for t as exogenous constants, it will also
consider t as constant. Solving (12) for constant  gives
The cost of debt depends, among other things, on the fraction of debt that is repaid each period,
b0. If (1c)b < a,  rises with b0, and so the cost of debt finance falls if it is paid back more
slowly. We can also see this in another way. If  (1c)b < a, then  < 1  p, that is the cost of
debt finance is less than the cost of retained earnings finance, and it is optimal to maintain a
maximum debt-equity ratio. One way to achieve that is to reduce debt repayment.
Equation (13) indicates that the cost of new share issue, µt, equals 1. This confirms the earlier
result that new share finance is more expensive than retained earnings finance, which costs
(1p) per guilder invested. Moreover,  if (1c)b < a, debt finance is cheaper than retained
earning finance. So then debt finance is cheapest and new share issue is the most expensive.
However, as indicated above, we assume that there are reasons not included in this model that
prevent the firm from using only debt to finance investment and thus from having a debt-equity
ratio of 100%.6 For convenience, we look at the steady state with constant levels of capital, labour and output. The analysis for a
steady state growth path with constant growth rates for capital, labour and output has the same qualitative results.
This will be implicitly shown in the next section, where we will show that the qualitative results for the static steady
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4 The steady state
We will first analyse the steady state.
6 In the steady state the capital stock is constant, so that
it = kt1.  We assume that when investment equals depreciation, (marginal) adjustment cost is
zero, so that  c = ci = ck = 0. Also, all prices rise with the inflation rate , including the shadow
price of capital qt, so that qt+1 = qt(1+). Equation (10) for the shadow price of capital then
becomes
where ra is defined as the real after tax rate of return on alternative assets, that is 1+ra = (1+a)/(1-
+). The marginal value of capital equals the present discounted value of a steady stream of after
tax marginal products and depreciation allowances, discounted by the real interest rate plus the
depreciation rate. 
Because marginal adjustment costs are zero in the steady state, the equation equating the
marginal value of capital to its marginal cost, (11), becomes
where we substituted µ = 1. The marginal cost of capital is a weighted average of the marginal
costs of the different ways of financing investment.
We assume that in the steady state the debt is a constant fraction of the value of the capital stock,
valued at the current price pi, that is, Bt / pi,tkt is constant in the steady state and equal to b1. This
implies that the debt repayment rate b0 equals the nominal depreciation rate, that is, the rate at
which the nominal value of the capital stock depreciates over time due to the combined effects of
physical depreciation and inflation. A unit of capital worth pi,t this period will depreciate to 19
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units of capital worth (1)pi,t+1 next period. The nominal depreciation rate is, therefore, [pi,t 
(1)pi,t+1] / pi,t which in the steady state equals (1+)  . Setting b0 equal to this and
combining (14), (15) and (16) gives
where, rb is the real interest rate on corporate debt, that is, 1+rb = (1+b)/(1+). This equation
equates the after tax nominal marginal product to the after tax user cost of capital. The user cost
of capital involves equity finance (both retained earnings and new shares), bond finance and tax
breaks. Finance through new share issue carries a cost premium over finance through retained
earnings. The equation may be solved for the optimal capital stock by inverting Fk.
The corporate tax rate enters the expression in three ways: by reducing the after tax nominal
marginal revenue product, through the deductibility of depreciation allowance and through the
deductibility of the nominal interest on bonds. The net effect of these three effects is in general
ambiguous. To get some intuition for the net effects, consider the following argument. If there
is no corporate tax, the optimal capital stock equates the marginal product of capital with its
marginal cost. The corporate tax reduces the marginal revenue product by a fraction c. The
corporate tax is, therefore, neutral with respect to the optimal capital stock if is also reduces the
marginal cost of capital by the same fraction c , for in that case marginal revenue and marginal
cost of capital remain equal at the original level of the capital stock. In terms of equation (17),
this means that we have to be able to write its right hand side as (1c) times a remainder term
that does not involve c. This, in turn implies that
The left hand side of this equation is the cost of capital not counting the tax deduction. The right
hand side equals the allowed deduction. So the corporate tax is neutral with respect to the
optimal capital stock if the tax deduction equals the full before tax cost of capital, that is, if the
cost of capital is fully deductible. The tax system encourages investment if the right hand side is
larger than the left hand side, that is, if the cost of capital is more than fully deductible, and vice7 For a formal derivation, see the appendix.
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versa.
7 Note that here we consider the condition for neutrality of the corporate tax rate by itself,
or conditional on the subsidy rate. We can also consider neutrality of the combined tax and
subsidy rates. The combined system is neutral if the right hand side of (17) divided by (1c) does
not depend on s and c.
To get a further feel for equation (17), consider some special cases. First, suppose that personal
and corporate taxes and investment subsidies are zero, that is p, c and s are zero. Then (17)
simplifies to the standard first order condition for capital:
Now, allow for taxes and subsidies, but assume that investment is financed only by retained
earnings. Furthermore assume that the depreciation allowance is zero. Then b1, n and v are zero,
and (17) becomes
So, the combined effect of tax and subsidy is neutral with respect to the steady state capital stock
if the subsidy rate equals the corporate tax rate. Note that a subsidy equal to the corporate tax
rate is equivalent to a system in which investment can be fully expensed, that is, immediately
deducted from taxation. So, if investment can be fully expensed, the tax system is also neutral
with respect to the capital stock. The reason for the neutrality result is simple and basically the
same as used above: both marginal benefit and marginal cost of capital are reduced in the same
proportion, so the optimal capital stock remains unchanged. Clearly, if the subsidy rate exceeds
the tax rate, there is a marginal subsidy to investment and the capital stock rises, and vice versa.
Now assume that at the margin all investment is bond financed and there are depreciation
allowances, but no subsidies (b1 = 1, s and n are zero). Then the general condition for neutrality
(18) reduces to the condition that the depreciation allowance v equals (1+)  , that is v has to
equal the economic nominal depreciation rate. Note that if investment is partly financed by
retained earnings (b1 < 1), the tax system is no longer neutral, because the cost of capital is no
longer fully deductible. The (implicit) interest cost of equity is not deductible.8  There may be an indirect effect on labour if corporate taxes change the capital stock. 
11
So, for the tax system to be neutral, the full cost of capital has to be deductible. This can be
achieved in several ways, such as through a subsidy rate equal to the corporate tax rate, an
immediate deduction of the full purchase price of the new investment or through a deduction
scheme in which the interest and depreciation costs are fully deductible, including the implicit
interest cost of equity. Note that the cost of labour is always fully deductible, so that the
corporate tax rate has no direct effect on employment in any case.
8 
So, if the cost of capital and labour are fully deductible, corporate taxes become a pure profits
tax. Under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, total revenue equals total costs,
profits are zero and there is no tax collection at all. Under imperfect competition, there are
profits, so corporate taxes may raise revenue without affecting the capital stock.
Capital taxation may even raise revenue and stimulate investment at the same time. For
instance, if new investment is purely bond financed and the fiscal depreciation rate exceeds the
economic one, the corporate tax provides a marginal subsidy to capital. Total tax collections may
still be positive, if profits are positive. If monopolistic competition with restricted entry leads to a
capital stock that is too low (as indicated by the fact that price equals a markup over marginal
cost), the corporate tax system may be designed so as to counteract this distortion and achieve a
first best outcome.
With free entry, however, we cannot just look at the marginal conditions for investment, but also
have to consider the inframarginal effects. Firms’ entry decisions are based on overall
profitability. If the net effect of a change in taxation is to raise tax revenue, new firms will be
deterred from entering, regardless of the marginal conditions. For an open economy like the
Netherlands, the inframarginal effects are likely to be large. We return to this point later on in
the paper.
5 Dynamics
Now we consider the full dynamic system, which allows for an evaluation of the impact of the
corporate tax on investment outside of the steady state. We maintain the assumptions that b, a
and  are constant. Dynamics occurs because after a shock capital does not immediately jump to
the new steady state, but follows a transition path. During the transition period Fk is not
constant and ck and ci are not zero. Looking at the first order conditions, this affects the second
and third equations (the q equations). The equation for  does not contain dynamics even9 On a steady state growth path, adjustment costs are not zero, so we need to use the general expressions in this
paragraph. 
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though it is a difference equation, because all variables in it are considered to be exogenous
constants by the firm. Hence  immediately jumps to its new steady state value, given by (14).
We maintain the assumption that on the transition path the debt-capital stock ratio remains
constant, so that b0 remains equal to the nominal depreciation rate (1+)  .
Solving (10) forward yields
The shadow price of capital equals the present value of the future marginal products (net of
marginal adjustment cost). This stream depreciates at the physical depreciation rate . Note that
in the steady state the marginal product is constant and the marginal adjustment cost is zero, so
that the above expression simplifies to its steady state version.
9
To find the expression for the optimal transition path for capital, we combine (11), (13), (14) and
(21) which yields
This expression sets the present value of the additional production associated with one unit of
additional investment equal to the present value of the cost of one unit of additional investment.
This additional cost consists of the cost of purchasing the investment and the cost of installing
it. The cost of purchasing the investment is the same as in the steady state, except that it is here
written in terms of the present value of the cost instead of the one period cost. That is, the term
between square brackets in (22) equals the terms in square brackets in (17), but here it is
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In the previous section we derived that the tax and subidy system is neutral with respect to the
marginal condition for the capital stock if the full cost of investment is tax deductible. In terms
of (17) this means that the term in square brackets in that equation can be written as the product
of 1c and something that does not involve the tax or subsidy rates. In that case the factor 1c
drops out of the equation and the tax and subsidy rates no longer enter the marginal condition
for capital.
Inspection of (22) reveals that the conditions for marginal neutrality of the tax and subsidy
system on the transition path are the same as in the steady state. The tax and subsidy variables
drop out of (22) if the term in square brackets can be written as the product of 1c and
something that does not involve the tax or subsidy rates. Since the terms in square brackets in
(17) and (22) are the same, the conditions for neutrality are the same as well.
Moreover, the direction of the effects of taxation are the same on the transition path and in the
steady state. If taxation reduces the term in square brackets by less than a factor 1c, the
optimal capital stock falls both in and out of the steady state. In that case an increase in the
corporate tax rate reduces investment immediately and the capital stock will move gradually to a
lower new steady state value.
6 Infra marginal effects: a suggestion
In the steady state, we may define the pre-tax user cost of capital, pk as
This is the steady state pre-tax user cost of capital in the sense that it equals the pre-tax product
of capital in the steady state, see equation (17). With pk defined in this way, we can write the
firm’s maximization problem as
where  denotes per period profits. This maximization problem leads to the same steady state
first order condition as before. We also define y = F(k,l) and cy = (wl + pkk) / y, so that y equals10 This begs the question why m* is positive, or more generally, why there are profits in the steady state. The








output and cy unit cost. After tax profits are (1c)(pyy  cyy). The after tax markup or profit
margin, m, is defined as after tax profits divided by total costs
Now assume that entry takes place until m has a certain value m* determined by the
international capital markets.
10 This implies that
m*/(1c) can be thought of as a pre-tax or gross markup. So, if the corporate tax rate rises, the
gross markup has to rise in order for net profitability defined in term of the after tax profit
margin to stay in line with international requirements.
The  analysis is this section represents the extreme case in which an increase in the
corporate tax rate is fully passed on into prices so that net profitability does not change. If the
firm’s profitability is solely product based, for instance because of brand loyalty or patent rights, 
this extreme case may be realistic for the long run. If profits are, however, also location specific,
so that moving to another country will reduce profitability, the firm may not move in response
to an inframarginal tax. In that case, the firm’s net profit margin will be reduced if the corporate
tax rises. This case will be particularly relevant for the short run.
7 Simulation
To get a feel for the effects of a change of the corporate tax rate on investment and the overall
economy, we have to embed the equations derived in this paper into a macro model. For that
purpose we use the JADE model, the operational macro model of CPB. We ran two simulations.
In the first we focused on the effects of a change in the corporate tax rate without considering
the inframarginal or entry/exit issue. For that purpose we used equation (23), the equation for
the pre-tax user cost of capital in the steady state as the cost of capital equation in the term11 The overall effect of a change in the corporate tax rate equals roughly the effect of a comparable change in the
income tax rate. This is required, because the incidence of both taxes is borne by the immobile factor of
production, labor.
15
pyFk  pk, the error correction term in the capital stock equation. This term represents the error
in equation (17), which is the first order condition for capital in the steady state.
Table 7.1 presents the calibrated
11 user cost of capital and its determinants for the exposed and
sheltered sectors for 1990. There are no investment subsidies, so s=0. The tax rate on dividends
is set equal to the overall income tax rate, including contributions to the social security system,
and equals 0.36. 45% of investments are financed with new debt (b1=0.45) and 3% with new
equity (n=0.03). Debt and equity finance both carry a risk premium. The risk premium on debt
is set at 2%. This risk premium is determined in such a way that the development of the cost
price roughly equals the price development. The physical depreciation rates are derived from the
capital statistics, in Dutch the “kapitaalgoederenstatistiek” collected by Statistics Netherlands.
The fiscal depreciation rates are higher than the physical ones, so that in terms of depreciation
allowance there is a positive incentive to invest. However, the implicit interest rate on equity
finance, including the risk premium, is not deductible, which reduces the incentive to invest.
The latter effect dominates so that a reduction in the corporate tax rate on balance reduces the
marginal incentive to invest.
Table 7.2 presents the results of a reduction in the corporate taxes by 1% GDP (the corporate tax
rate falls about 8.5 percentage point). Because for the Dutch case the cost of capital is not fully
deductible, a decline in corporate tax rate reduces the user costs of capital and improves
investment. In the paper this happens because marginal profitability improves, and possibly,
through a substitution effect. In the macro model there is an additional effect through increased
aggregate demand, partly though the multiplier effect and partly because the cost reduction is
ultimately passed on into lower prices, improved competitiveness and increased net exports. The
Table 7.1 User costs of capital and its determinants in 1990
a)
user cost of capital
b equipment buildings
equipment buildings c p ra rb nb 1  
exposed 0.11 0.07 0.34 0.36 (1tc)r+0.05 r+0.02 0.03 0.45 0.100 0.04 0.038 0.055 0.02 0.056
sheltered 0.18 0.08 0.34 0.36 (1tc)r+0.05 r+0.02 0.03 0.45 0.153 0.10 0.038 0.055 0.03 0.056
a) s=0, r is the long-term interest rate (8,9% in 1990)
b) as a fraction of the price of investment goods pi12 For an analysis of the relationship between the cost of capital and equilibrium unemployment and the
equilibrium labour income share, see D.A.G. Draper and F.H. Huizinga (2000).
13 The estimated long run gross markup is .2. With c equal to .35, this implies that m* = 0.13.
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increase in production also raises employment. The reduced cost of capital lowers equilibrium
unemployment and raises the equilibrium labour income share.
12
In the second simulation we consider the effects of a change in the corporate tax rate through
the entry/exit decisions of firms. For that purpose we included equation (26) as the error
correction term in the price equations. For m* we chose the value 0.13 based on estimation
results in Broer, Draper and Huizinga (2000).
13 Again we consider a reduction in the corporate
taxes by 1 % GDP. We have assumed that the gross markup will fall by 35% of the  amount
predicted by equation (26), so that the gross markup falls, but the net markup rises. Table 7.3
presents the results. Prices fall because the gross markup falls. This stimulates exports,
Table 7.2 Cumulated effects of a reduction in corporate taxes by 1% GDP, user cost of capital channel
1999 2000 2002  2006
 p r i c e s
 wage rate enterprises              % -0.13 -0.09 0.02 0.10
 gross value added private sector   % -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13
 q u a n t i t i e s
 private consumption                % 0.04 0.15 0.48 0.92
 private investment excl. dwellings % 0.34 0.55 0.64 1.35
 exports of goods excl. energy      % 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.09
 imports of goods                   % 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.65
 net national income                % 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.44
 gross value added exposed          % 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.37
 gross value added sheltered        % 0.07 0.17 0.35 0.70
 employment enterprises (fte)       % 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.51
 empl.enterprises(fte) low skilled  % 0.11 0.16 0.30 0.66
 empl.enterprises(fte) high skilled % 0.06 0.10 0.20 0.42
 unemployed persons                 D -3.6 -5.3 -9.2 -19.0
 q u o t e s
 capacity utilization rate exposed  D 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11
 capacity utilization rate sheltered D -0.10 0.00 0.03 0.02
 current account (% NNI)        D -0.06 -0.08 -0.17 -0.36
 labour income share enterprises    D -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.1514  Devereux-Griffith (1998) estimate that a reduction in the effective tax rate by 1% increases the probability that a
firm chooses to invest in that country by between 0.4 and 1.7 %. The  effective tax rate in the Netherlands is about
30% (source: Worldscope database) and the statutory rate 35%. Assuming proportionality, a 1% point decrease in
the statutory tax rate leads to a (30/35)% = .85% point, or 2.8%  reduction in the effective tax rate and an increase
in the probability to invest in the Netherlands of between 1.1 and 4.8%.  We assume  that this leads to the same
increase in foreign capital invested in the  Netherlands.  About 30% of foreign capital inflow is direct investment
(as opposed to portfolio investment), and foreign capital makes up about 30% of total capital invested in the
Netherlands. So, a rough estimate indicates that a 1% increase in foreign capital inflow corresponds to a 0.3 x 0.3 =
9% increase in total direct investment in the Netherlands. So, a 1% point reduction in the corporate capital stock
increases investment through the entry / exit channel by between .09 x 1.1 and .09 x 4.8 %, that is, between 0.1 and
0.44%.
An alternative approach is to look at direct estimates of the corporate tax rate on FDI. This leads to semi-
elasticities of the effective tax rate with respect to FDI inflow of between -1.5 (consensus estimate of Hines, 1999)
and -4.3 (Gorter-Parish, 2000),. In the Netherlands, FDI is about 50% of total capital investment. However, most of
that is purely financial transactions. Probably only 20% of total FDI represents new direct investment. Assuming
again that a 1% point decrease in the statutory tax rate leads to a 0.85% point decrease in the effective tax rate, we
estimate that a decrease in the corporate tax rate leads to an increase in investment of between 0.85 x 0.5 x 0.2 x 1.5
and 0.85 x 0.5 x 0.2 x 4.3 %, that is between 0.13 and 0.36%, about the same effect as calculated using the results of
Devereux-Griffith.
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production and employment. Equilibrium unemployment falls because the gross markup falls,
which allows firms to pay a higher labour income share. The infra-marginal effects on
investment are in between the elasticities that can be calculated from the economic literature.
The results of Devereux-Griffith (1998), Hines (1999) and Gorter Parikh (2000) point to a
corporate tax rate semi-elasticity on investment  in between 0.1 and 0.4.
14 
The results of the two simulations are qualitatively similar. The results suggests that it is
improper to ignore the infra-marginal effects of a change in the corporate tax rate.
To get an impression of the combined effects of the marginal and infra-marginal effects the
results in tables 7.2 and 7.3 need to be added. They can be compared with the effects of a
reduction in income taxes by 1% GDP, which are presented in appendix B.18
8  Conclusions
This paper considers two channels for the impact of a change in the corporate tax rate. The first
one concerns the change in the user cost of capital, which determines a firm’s optimal capital
stock given  that the firm is located in the Netherlands. A reduction in the corporate tax rate
reduces the user cost of capital because cost of capital is not fully deductible. The second
channel deals with the direct effect of corporate taxation on profits. If capital is sufficiently
mobile, the after tax profit margin cannot be affected by the corporate tax rate in equilibrium.
Therefore, a rise in the corporate tax rate must be compensated by a compensating rise in the
gross markup. To get a feel for the quantitative effects of these two channels, they have been
incorporated into the JADE model, the econometric macro model of CPB. Simulations indicate
that both channels are of the same order of magnitude. This suggests that only considering the
Table 7.3 Cumulated effects of a reduction in corporate taxes by 1% GDP, entry / exit channel
1999 2000 2002  2006
 p r i c e s
 wage rate enterprises              % -0.38 -0.59 -0.74 -0.67
 gross value added private sector   % -0.43 -0.72 -1.08 -1.35
 q u a n t i t i e s
 private consumption                % -0.10 -0.14 -0.03 0.33
 private investment excl. dwellings % 0.07 0.23 0.89 1.68
 exports of goods excl. energy      % 0.29 0.63 1.18 1.58
 imports of goods                   % 0.17 0.37 0.88 1.40
 net national income                % -0.16 -0.20 -0.09 0.16
 gross value added exposed          % 0.17 0.33 0.66 0.99
 gross value added sheltered        % 0.01 0.09 0.37 0.82
 employment enterprises (fte)       % 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.71
 empl.enterprises(fte) low skilled  % 0.02 0.08 0.35 0.96
 empl.enterprises(fte) high skilled % 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.56
 unemployed persons                 D -1.0 -3.8 -13.0 -29.1
 q u o t e s
 capacity utilization rate exposed  D 0.13 0.24 0.39 0.38
 capacity utilization rate sheltered D 0.03 0.09 0.24 0.26
 current account (% NNI)        D -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.25
 labour income share enterprises    D 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.5619
user cost of capital approach ignores an important aspect of the impact of a change in corporate
taxation.
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The discounted value of the fiscal depreciations can be split up into depreciations on the existing




























































































We split this expression into two components, AA an AB, with AA equal to
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(a.7)
where AFt equals the depreciation allowance on investments installed up to time t:
The value of AFt is given and therefore does not affect the optimization problem.
The Lagrangian
Define DAt as the dividends before the depreciation allowance, that is
Then the Lagrangian can be written as
This Lagrangian leads directly to the first order conditions (9) through (13).
The steady state22
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(a.13)
In the steady state c = ci = ck = 0. Also, all prices rise with the inflation rate , including the
shadow price of capital qt, so that qt+1 = qt(1+). Equation (10) reads in the steady state as
Define 1+ra = (1+a)/(1+). Substituting this gives
which is equation (15). Rewriting this equation in terms of the after tax marginal product of
capital gives
Substituting equation (16) gives
Substituting (14) gives
Substituting b0 = (1+)   gives
Define rb = (1+b)/(1+)1= (b)/(1+). Also,  ra = (a)/(1+). Substituting these relations
gives23
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which is equation (17). 
Neutrality
The above equation can be written as:
with
Differentiating the user cost of capital pk with respect to c gives:
so that the user cost of capital rises with, falls with or is independent of a change in the
corporate tax rate if A is larger than, smaller than or equal to B. If at the margin all investment is
bond financed and there are no subsidies (b1=1, s and n zero), equality of A and B implies
Substituting rb = (b)/(1+) and ra = (a)/(1+) gives
Dynamics
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Substituting (11) and dividing by 1p gives
Substituting (13) and 14) gives
Substituting b0 = (1+)  , gives
































which is equation (22) in the main text.26
Appendix B: Simulation reduction in income taxes
Table 8.1 Cumulated effects of a reduction in income taxes by 1% GDP
1999 2000 2002  2006
 p r i c e s
 wage rate enterprises              % -0.89 -1.22 -1.07 -0.82
 gross value added private sector   % -0.23 -0.45 -0.62 -0.64
 q u a n t i t i e s
 private consumption                % 0.95 1.24 1.55 1.91
 private investment excl. dwellings % 1.01 1.83 1.83 1.87
 exports of goods excl. energy      % -0.08 0.02 0.32 0.56
 imports of goods                   % 0.62 0.80 1.18 1.49
 net national income                % 0.41 0.54 0.71 0.93
 gross value added exposed          % 0.36 0.51 0.77 0.98
 gross value added sheltered        % 0.57 0.87 1.23 1.62
 employment enterprises (fte)       % 0.45 0.80 1.14 1.46
 empl.enterprises(fte) low skilled  % 0.59 1.03 1.42 1.85
 empl.enterprises(fte) high skilled % 0.37 0.67 0.97 1.23
 unemployed persons                 D -18.9 -30.2 -37.9 -47.8
 q u o t e s
 capacity utilization rate exposed  D 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.14
 capacity utilization rate sheltered D 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.06
 current account (% NNI)        D -0.39 -0.51 -0.65 -0.75
 labour income share enterprises    D -0.56 -0.54 -0.25 -0.03